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INSOLVENCY IN THE UK CONSTRUCTION SECTOR  
John G Lowe1 and Elias Moroke 
 
Department of Construction Management and Economics, Glasgow Caledonian University, 
Cowcaddens Road, Glasgow, G3 6BU, UK. 
The construction industry has always tended to suffer a disproportionate share of both 
corporate insolvency and individual bankruptcy within Great Britain. This is 
particularly the case in the aftermath of economic recessions. The latest figures seem 
to indicate that almost a quarter of all corporate insolvencies in England and Wales 
involve Construction Companies. In Scotland, the situation is worse with almost one 
third of insolvencies coming from the sector. This is way out of line with 
construction’s five to six per cent share of Gross Domestic Product. Because of the 
differing legal definitions between England and Wales and Scotland, the main 
analysis will use data from England and Wales. Scotland and Northern Ireland are 
excluded from the formal analysis. Time series data on insolvency by industry is 
available from 1969 through to 2008 for England and Wales. This period covers three 
major recessions; in the mid-1970s, the late-1980s and the current slump. In the case 
of Scotland the data is available from 1998 to 2009. This only includes one recession 
so will be of less use for the purpose of this analysis. This paper will seek to analyse 
the causes of this using time series data with a multiple regression model. The key 
variables tests will include level of profitability for construction companies, 
fluctuations in demand, and availability of working capital, and lagged general 
insolvency data to measure the domino effect. This is concerned with an insolvent 
company dragging down one or more members of its supply chain. The results proved 
somewhat counter intuitive in some aspects. 
Keywords: bankruptcy, insolvency, liquidation. 
INTRODUCTION 
From the 1970s onwards, construction in the UK has been perceived to have a 
problem with insolvency. This was identified by Hillebrandt (1977) who showed that, 
during the recession of the mid-1970s, the failure rate of construction firms was 
double that of companies as a whole. This situation has continued through the slumps 
of the 1980s, the 1990s and the recent recession. More work was carried out by 
Hughes et al. (1998) in this area. 
Construction tends to account for 15-20% of all insolvencies in the UK. The most 
recent statistics show that more construction companies become insolvent than for 
much larger sections such as manufacturing. The failure rate for construction remains 
roughly twice that which would be expected for an industry producing around 6% of 
gross domestic product. Recently the insolvency rate for industry as a whole is less 
than that experienced in the recession from the 1989-1992. In fact is it similar to that 
experienced in the downturn of the early 1980s. 
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Overall insolvency rates appear to have peaked at the end of 2008 with a small drop 
into 2009 although construction insolvency rates appear to be still rising. Clearly as 
insolvency is a lagging variable, there could be more still to come especially if the 
recession ends up a double-dip similar to that experienced in the early 1990s. 
INSOLVENCY 
Introduction 
There are two basic categories of insolvency. 
1. Bankruptcy applies to individuals including the self-employed. 
2. Liquidations apply to companies. 
Figures for the above are published separately. 
In addition there are legal differences between England and Wales and Scotland. This 
makes UK wide statistics unfeasible. The data is published separately for England and 
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. There have been changes in the legal 
definitions in Scotland. Hence time series data in only available as far back as 1998. 
Individual insolvency 
This includes Bankruptcy Orders and Individual Arrangements and England and 
Wales. In Scotland this can take the form of Sequestrations and Protected Trust 
Deeds. 
In the case of England and Wales here have been legal changes in the 1986 Insolvency 
Act and the 2002 Enterprise Act. This makes long-term time series data difficult to 
present by industry especially given the recent changes in the Standard Industrial 
Classification. Data is available from 1990 to 2005. 
Corporate insolvency 
This can take the form of Company Liquidations, Receivership Appointments, In 
Receivership (under Enterprise Act 2002), and Company Voluntary Arrangements. 
Data is available from 1990 to 2009 Quarter 3. Data subdivided by industry is 
available for much of the period apart from Quarter 4 of 2006 and Quarters 1-2 of 
2007. The problem related to changes in the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC, 
2007). This had no major impact on construction. 
These gaps were filled in by interpolation to complete the annual series from 1990 to 
2009. Data from The Department of Trade and Industry from 1969 to 1989 to give a 
continuous data set. 
Data for Corporate Insolvency 
The data series for corporate insolvency and construction insolvency in England and 
Wales for 1969 to 2009 are presented in Figure 1. 
This shows a general rise in both construction and general insolvency over the period 
studied. There are peaks and troughs but the underlying trends in both cases are 
definitely upward. The peaks in construction insolvency appear to occur in 1977, 
1985, 1992, 2002, and 2009. The position for general corporate insolvency follows 
this pattern generally apart from the latter recently peaking in 2008.The situation in 
the double dip recession from 1989 to 2002 remains the most severe for both general 
insolvency and construction insolvency by some margin. 
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Figure 1: Corporate Insolvency in England and Wales 1969-2009 
FACTORS TRIGGERING INSOLVENCY 
Introduction 
The factors responsible for insolvency are many and varied. They can be divided into 
factors that can trigger insolvency – such as poor profitability or cash flow problems – 
and the more long term underlying causes which are more specific to construction 
(Lowe, 1997). 
Profitability 
A potential trigger for insolvency is low profitability. Any company not making an 
adequate return on capital invested will likely be vulnerable to insolvency. A period of 
low profitability or even losses may be overcome but this is unlikely to be sustained 
into the long term. 
Construction is a very competitive sector of the economy with few barriers to entry of 
new firms. This will usually involve few barriers to exit from the market. 
Cash flow issues 
Cash flow problems are another trigger factor for insolvency. It is perfectly possible 
for profitable firms to become insolvent if they have cash flow problems. This 
effectively involves a company being squeezed between slow paying clients and 
impatient suppliers and subcontractors. Insolvency can be the outcome of such 
situations if their bankers are unwilling to fill the gap. 
Companies that are short of working capital or who have poor credit ratings will be 
particularly susceptible to this issue. See Kenley (2003) for more details on the issue 
of working capital. 
Domino theory 
This involves situations where the insolvency of one company leads to other 
companies being dragged down as well. For example, if a client goes bust while 
owing large sums of money to a contractor, this could lead to insolvency for the 
contractor. In addition it is possible that if the contractor owed money to one or more 
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UNDERLYING CAUSES OF INSOLVENCY 
Fluctuating demand 
It has often been argued that construction can suffer from short-term fluctuations in 
demand to a greater extent than other sectors. This was traditionally blamed on the use 
of construction as an economic regulator by successive governments (Lean and 
Goodall, 1966) (NEDO, 1975). 
Aside from this traditional macroeconomic theory suggests that as construction is 
largely a provider of capital goods, demand will fluctuate more so than industries 
dealing with consumption goods. This mechanism is known as the accelerator. 
It this linkage is demonstrated, it may explain why construction does suffer from 
insolvency more than other sectors. 
Availability of credit 
Lack of availability of credit is a major factor in insolvency triggered by cash flow. 
This might arise as a result of a general shortage of credit as illustrated by the credit 
crunch that was a major factor at the start of the recent recession. Credit squeeze was a 
means of macroeconomic management used in the UK up to the late 1970s. Both have 
the outcome of making bank borrowing harder. 
This will be more of a problem for firms with poor credit ratings and those who lack 
collateral for loans. Construction companies have less in the form of fixed capital 
assets to use as collateral than those in other sectors of the economy. If the inherent 
susceptibility of construction to fluctuating demand is taken into account it would not 
be surprising if construction companies were considered as worse credit risks than for 
other industries. 
DATA USED FOR STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Dependent variable 
Of the various datasets on insolvency available, it was decided to use Company 
Insolvencies for England and Wales as the dependant variable. This set was used 
because it provided the longest continuous time series of insolvency presented by 
industry. The figures for individual bankruptcy tend to follow a very similar pattern to 
company liquidations. 
The analysis is restricted to England and Wales because of the limitations in the data 
availability for Northern Ireland and the different legal definitions for Scotland.  This 
leaves a problem as most of the macroeconomic data that will be used for the 
independent variables will be for the whole of the UK. This should not present a major 
problem for the analysis as England and Wales constitute the largest sector of the UK 
economy. In any event many of the firms operating in Scotland are headquartered 
down south and the economic climate is similar. The increasing internationalization of 
the UK construction sector could have implications for future analysis but this is not 
an issue at the moment. The data is taken from the Government’s Insolvency Service 
website. 
Independent variables 
The analysis is based on four independent variables 
1. Profitability of the UK construction sector: This is measured using the 
percentage return on capital invested. That is total company profits and 
surpluses divided by capital employed (fixed and variable capital). The data 
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was for profits was taken from the UK National Accounts while that for the 
capital employed by derived from the same source (Lowe, 1992). 
2. Working capital used: This is the ratio of working capital employed in the UK 
construction sector divided by value added. This is lagged by one year to take 
account of nature of insolvency as a lagging variable. The data was taken from 
UK National Accounts. 
3. The Domino theory: This uses the overall corporate insolvency figures for all 
industries lagged by one year. This data was taken from the Government’s 
Insolvency Service. 
4. Fluctuating demand: This uses the year on year percentage change in 
construction value added. This was taken from Economic Trends Annual 
Supplement. 
ANALYSIS 
The variables used 
The variables used in the analysis are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1: The variables used in the model 
Number Variable Source Variable Notes 
1 Construction insolvency The Insolvency Service C Dependent variable 
2 Return on capital UK National Accounts R Lagged one year 
3 Working capital ratio UK National Accounts W Lagged one year 
4 Domino theory The Insolvency Service L Lagged one year 
5 Change in output Economic Trends Q 
The regression model 
The analysis employed a standard multiple regression model of the form: 
      Ý      =       +    2 X2  +    3 X3   +  4 X4  + …… +  n Xn  
 Where  Ý = Estimate of dependent variable Y 
   Xi = Independent variable i 
    = Intercept value 
   i = Coefficient for independent variable i 
The model was run using the regression function on Excel for the years 1969 to 2008 
using the data included in Table 3. The results indicated that the model had an R2 
value of 79.6% and an adjusted R2 value of 77.3%. This suggests that just short of 
80% of the variation in construction insolvency is apparently explained by the four 
independent variables used in the model. The results for each variable are tabulated 
below: 
Table 2: Results from the regression model 
Number Factor Variable Coefficient P-value Different from zero 
 Intercept C - 370.43 0.5889 Not significant 
2 Return on capital R 1490.24 0.0213 Not significant 
3 Working capital ratio W 128.05 0.9238 Not significant 
4 Domino theory L 0.1338 0.0000 Significant 
5 Change in output Q -5120.85 0.0010 Significant 
The working capital ratio appeared to have no real impact on construction insolvency. 
Profitability does appear to have a measurable impact on construction productivity. 
However the regression sign is positive rather than the expected negative value. The 
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regression coefficient for profitability is different from zero at a level of confidence of 
98% with a p-value of 0.013. 
The domino effect does appear to have a significant impact on construction insolvency 
with the expected positive coefficient. The very low p-value of 5.09E-13 indicates that 
this coefficient is certainly statistically different from zero to a very high level of 
confidence. 
Fluctuating demand also seems to have a significant effect on construction insolvency 
with the expected negative regression coefficient sign. This is different from zero with 
a level of confidence of 99.9%. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The results of the analysis are partially counter intuitive. Profitability does appear to 
impact on insolvency but the sign on the regression coefficient is positive. This 
suggests that insolvency is associated with higher levels of profitability. The figures 
show the underlying trends of insolvency on a generally upward trajectory over the 
period studied. The more recent years show increased economic activity in 
construction, higher profitability and higher insolvency.  The most likely explanation 
is that the risk inherent in the construction sector is increasing over the period studied. 
High returns on capital invested are the rewards for risk taking, while insolvency is 
the downside. Hence as risk increases both returns on capital and insolvency have also 
increased. 
The level of working capital held by construction companies appears to have little or 
no impact on insolvency. This may be down to technical factors. As insolvency has 
increased the proportion of value added required as working capital has reduced. This 
may be down to contractors holding less inventory due to the increased use of ‘just in 
time’ approaches to material ordering. These changes could well be masking the real 
impact of the requirements for working capital impacting on insolvency. 
The results for the domino effect seem to match the theory with a high positive 
association with insolvency. Similarly the test for fluctuations in output give the 
expected negative results with growth in output being associated with linked to lower 
levels of insolvency. 
The one area that it was not tested was that of credit availability. This should be the 
main focus of a subsequent study. This is particularly the case as it generally held that 
cash flow factors do have a major impact on insolvency. 
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C L (£m) (£m) P W Q Q 
1968 - 3,165 482 1,946 25% 41% 68.9 - 
1969 650 3,641 522 2,114 25% 42% 68.4 -0.0073 
1970 821 3,689 570 2,285 25% 43% 67.1 -0.0194 
1971 651 3,506 716 2,481 29% 52% 68.3 0.0176 
1972 518 3,063 1,146 2,784 41% 65% 69.5 0.0173 
1973 500 2,575 1,502 3,149 48% 76% 71.2 0.0239 
1974 776 3,720 1,482 4,186 35% 61% 63.8 -0.1160 
1975 956 5,336 1,747 4,506 39% 58% 60.5 -0.0545 
1976 977 5,939 1,747 5,020 35% 58% 59.6 -0.0151 
1977 1,004 5,837 1,988 5,882 34% 53% 59.4 -0.0034 
1978 929 5,086 1,928 7,390 26% 49% 63.4 0.0631 
1979 789 4,537 2,698 9,009 30% 50% 63.9 0.0078 
1980 949 6,890 2,944 9,771 30% 54% 60.4 -0.0579 
1981 990 8,596 3,012 9,912 30% 58% 55.7 -0.0844 
1982 1,422 11,667 3,471 10,111 34% 64% 60.1 0.0732 
1983 1,776 13,406 4,320 10,275 42% 76% 63.9 0.0595 
1984 1,831 13,721 4,606 10,624 43% 83% 66.9 0.0448 
1985 1,975 14,898 5,427 11,540 47% 84% 67.2 0.0045 
1986 1,914 14,405 5,974 12,396 48% 87% 69.9 0.0386 
1987 1,490 11,439 7,656 13,512 57% 100% 78.1 0.1050 
1988 1,471 9,427 10,282 15,747 65% 111% 84.9 0.0801 
1989 1,638 10,456 10,808 18,274 59% 112% 89.4 0.0503 
1990 2,445 15,051 8,376 21,256 39% 89% 92.0 0.0283 
1991 3,373 21,827 3,363 21,385 16% 74% 84.6 -0.0875 
1992 3,830 24,425 3,391 20,754 16% 72% 81.2 -0.0419 
1993 3,189 20,708 3,923 19,303 20% 79% 80.3 -0.0112 
1994 2,401 16,728 3,812 22,181 17% 73% 83.3 0.0360 
1995 1,844 14,536 5,157 23,439 22% 75% 83.9 0.0072 
1996 1,610 13,461 3,562 23,238 15% 77% 86.3 0.0278 
1997 1,419 12,610 5,144 23,181 22% 78% 88.7 0.0271 
1998 1,325 13,203 7,400 24,510 30% 75% 89.7 0.0111 
1999 1,529 14,280 7,074 25,820 27% 82% 89.8 0.0011 
2000 1,474 14,317 7,736 26,094 30% 80% 90.2 0.0044 
2001 1,509 14,972 9,096 28,398 32% 86% 92.1 0.0206 
2002 1,840 16,306 9,333 28,796 32% 93% 95.5 0.0356 
2003 1,728 14,184 9,762 32,000 31% 93% 100.0 0.0450 
2004 1,653 12,192 13,207 32,988 40% 104% 104.0 0.0385 
2005 1,775 12,893 12,055 33,801 36% 105% 105.4 0.0133 
2006 2,087 13,137 14,591 33,469 44% 113% 106.7 0.0122 
2007 1,979 12,507 10,461 34,788 30% 112% 109.3 0.0238 
2008 2,771 15,535 - - - - 108.1 -0.0111 
 
